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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
JON WAKELUM, an individual; and Mn~(]3±,;---+)-- LAW CLE K 
RESSLER, an individual doing business as ) 
M&M RE Holdings, ) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
and 
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.c., an Idaho limited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an 
individual, 
Defendants-Third Party Defendants-
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-200~ 
Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT TO LA.R. 30 was fiIt 
counsel for the parties on March 16, 2010. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORI 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed b{ 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Hagood's Motion for Summar; 
Judgment, file-stamped July 9,2009. 
. fA t-
DATED this ~ day of March 2010. 
F or the Supreme Court 
AUGMENTATIO 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc : Counsel of Record 
GRANT G STIPULA TIO TO AUG ME T THE RECORD - Docket o. 36940-21 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and MIKE 
RESSLER, an individual doing business as 
M&M RE Holdings, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmalTied man, 
and 
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.c. , an Idaho limited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an 
individual, 
Defendants-Third Party Defendants-
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING RENEWED 
) SECOND STIPULATION TO 
) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-2009 
) Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
An ORDER DENYING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was issued by 
this Court on April 7, 2010 denying the request to augment the record as the documents submitted 
did not bear the file stamp of the district court as required by I.AR. 30(a) 
A RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT 
TO I.AR. 30 was filed by counsel for Respondent Thomas A Hagood on April 13, 2010. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall 
include the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped November 26, 2008; and 
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped November 26, 
2008. 
ORDER GRANTING RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT TV"" -
Docket No. 36940-2009 
.. t-
DA TED this 1-0 day of April 2010. 
For the Supreme Court 
6feftM ra~ 
Stephen W. Kenyon, CI1fk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD-
Docket No. 36940-2009 
Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar 10# S043) 
Angela. M. Reed (ro State Bar (1)# 7221) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701 "2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
S:\Cl.tENTS\I 0292\ 1 \Motion to Amend ComplAint. DOC 
Attorneys for John Wakelum and Mike Ressler 
I;:' PAGE 02/133 
r I .A.k 53 ~M. 
NOV 262008 /' 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M BECK. OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and MIKE 
RESSLER, an individual doing business as 
"M&M RE Holdings", 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Defendant. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and Scott Bullock, an individual 
and LARRY DOWNS, an individual, 
Third Party Defendants. 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT M 1 
Case No, CV 08-8465 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
EXHIBIT 
page 5 of 24 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs~ Jon Wakelum and Mike Ressler, by and through their 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley Lf.,P~ hereby moves this Court for al1 order allowing 
amendment of this complaint to the form attached hereto (changes from original Complaint 
indicated by redlining). This Motion is made and based upon Rules 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil IJrocedure and the interests of justice and the Memorandum in SUpp011 of the Matioll to 
Amend, which is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 2l~ay of November, 2008. 
MonON TO AMI~Nf) COMPLAINT· 2 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Page 6 of 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6<?'/dUY of November, 200B, I caused to be served a true 
and conect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,. and addressed to the following: 
Jay Gustavsen 
Davison, Copple. Copple & C()X 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Blvd. 
1>.0. Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phillip J. CoUaer 
Anderson, Juliall & Hull, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83 707 ~ 7426 
Terry Michaelson 
Hamilton Michaelson & Hitty, LLP 
1303 12th Avenue Road 
P.O, Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653·0065 
v- U,S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~ Hand Delivery 
~Fax 
U.S. Mail 
~~ Overnight Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
.-X-Fax 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
~Fax 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
MOTION TO AMltND COMl'tAlNT ·3 
Thomas E. Dvorak (10 State Bar TD# $043) 
Angela M. Reed (10 State Bar lD# 7221) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Bojse~ Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
S:\CLlENTS\10292\1\Mcmo in Support ofMtn to Amend.DOC 
Attorneys for John Wakelum and Mike Ressler 
CANYON COUNTY T5 
wp 1'1 
PAGE £13/£13 
'/"~~ 77 
F A.k )~39M. 
NOV 262008../ 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M BECK, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR mE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and MIKE 
RESSLER, an individual doing business as 
"M&M RE Holdings", 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Defendant. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.C.; an Idaho Hmited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and Scolt Bullock, an individual 
and LARRY DOWNS. an individual, 
Third Party Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-8465 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
EXHIBIT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 1 I~ 
Page 22 of 2L 
) 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, JOll Wakelum and Mike Ressler, by and through their 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LU·, flnd submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend Complaint. This case arises out of an absolute auction sale. which was held by 
Defendant Hagood through his agents, the other defendants. At the conclusion of the sale, 
Defendant Hagood refused to proceed forward and sign a Memorandum of Sale. Defendant 
Hagood has, in his answer in this matter and now in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, taken the position of the Idaho Statute of Frauds, Idaho Code Section 28· 
12-20 I, bars the enforcement of the sale because he did not sign a sufficient written 
memorandum. Purely out of an abundance of caution, and in the event the court determines that 
Hagood's position is correct. the Plaintiffs desire to protect their right a recovery and therefore 
seek to amend their claim to add a claim under the Idaho Consumer Pl'Otcction Act. 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Ida.ho Code Section 48~60 1, at. saq., basically 
prohibits acts or practices that are misleading, false or deceptive to the consumer. The act itself 
does not define consumer, but consumer is defined in the regulations to include: 
"a person who purchases, lease, 01' rents, or solicits a purchase, 
lease. rent or otherwise give consideration for any goods or 
services." 
LD.A .P.A. Rule 04.02.01.020.13. Persons are defined to include: 
"natural persons, corporations, both foreign and domeslic~ 
companies, business entities, trusts, partnerships, both limited and 
general, associations, both incorporated/unincorporated, and any 
othel' legal entity or group associating fact, although not a legal 
entity, or any agent or assign, heir, employee, representative, or 
servant thereof." 
I.D.A.P.A. Rule 04.02.01(38). 
Goods as defined by the act include real property. Idaho Code Section 48~602(6). In its 
broadest sense, the Consumer Protection Act prohibits acts that are deceptive to a buyer. If it is 
MI':MonANJ)lIM IN StJI)I'OIU OF MOTION TO AMltNn COMPLAINT ~ 2 
v 
Page 23 of 2£ 
found in this case that the Idaho Statute of Frauds prohibits holding an absolute auction unless, 
as Defendant IIagood contends! fl written binding sales contract is signed after the factj then 
advertising in an absolute auction could constitute a deceptive trade practice under the Consumer 
Pwtection Act. Accordingly, leave to amel1d the complaint to plead such a claim is appropriate, 
DATED this 2-?.. Zy of November! 2008. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
drA / ~~yy 
Trromas E. Dvorak 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MEMOf~AN:I)\JM IN SlWl'ORT OF MOTION TO AMEN!) COMPI-AINT - 3 
page 24 of 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _2$'~ay of November, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Jay Gustavsen 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise. Idaho 83701 
Phillip J. Collacr 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707~7426 
Terry Michaelson 
Hamilton Michaelson & Hilty, LLP 
1303 12th Avenue Road 
P.O. Box 65 
Nampa, ID 83653-0065 
U.S. Mail 
___ Overnight Mail 
_ Hand Delivery 
-y-Fax 
U.S. Mail 
. __ Overnight Mail 
-;-T- Hand Deli very 
~Fax 
U.S. Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Deli very 
_~Fax 
TI)(~mas E. D orak 
MEMOI~ANf)UM IN Sm'PORI' 0',' MOTION TO AM.:ND COMPl.AJN'f - 4 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and Mn~(+E:----+)--
RESSLER, an individual doing business as ) 
M&M RE Holdings, ) ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
and 
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.c., an Idaho limited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an 
individual, 
Defendants-Third Party Defendants-
Respondents. 
) TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-2009 
) Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT TO LA.R. 30 was filed by 
counsel for the parties on March 16,2010. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Hagood's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped July 9,2009 . 
• fA I-
DATED this ~ day of March 2010. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
I 
. , 
Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043) 
Angela M. Reed eID State Bar ID# 7221) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
6073%_1 
Attorneys/or John Wakelurn and Mike Ressler 
JUl 092009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J ORAKE, OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and MIKE 
RESSLER, an individual doing business as 
"M&M RE Holdings", 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Defendant. 
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS 
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company, 
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL 
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and Scott Bullock, an individual 
and LARRY DOWNS, an individual, 
ThirdP Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposmON TO 
Case No. CV 08-8465 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Jon Wakelum ("Wakelum") and Mike Ressler ("Ressler"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Thomas Hagood's ("Hagood") Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, which seeks a 
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICPA") claim. For 
the reasons set forth herein, Hagood is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' ICPA 
claim because: 
• Defendants representations in the auction materials that were disseminated to the 
public in advance of the auction sale were separate from Hagood's promise to 
convey the Property; and 
• Plaintiffs are seeking damages under the ICPA designed to compensate Plaintiffs 
for Defendants violations of the ICPA. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Hagood's Reliance on the Keriotis, Canell, and Zager Cases is Misplaced Because 
the Source of Plaintiffs' ICPA Claim against the Defendants Is Derived From False 
Representations Regarding the Auction Sale that Were Made By the Defendants 
Before the Oral Contract Between Plaintiffs and Hagood was Consummated and 
Because Plaintiffs Are Not Seeking Contract Damages. 
Hagood contends that Plaintiffs' ICPA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs are 
indirectly attempting to recover damages predicated upon Hagood's breach ofthe oral contract 
that was consummated between Plaintiffs and Hagood at the absolute auction sale of Hagood's 
property. To support this contention, Hagood primarily relies on the out of state cases of 
Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App. Tex. 1980) and Canel/ v. 
Arcola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953). Keriotis and Canel/, however, when analyzed 
in connection with their progeny, are distinguishable from the instant case because the 
misrepresentations about the nature of the auction in the instant case were collateral, or separate 
and apart from, to Hagood's breach of his promise to convey. In other words, the deceptive 
PLAJNTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposmoN TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 
statement made regarding the nature of the auction was distinct from the contract to convey the 
Property the Court has ruled unenforceable. 
1. Keriotis and Its Progeny 
In Keriotis, which was a 1980 decision out of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the 
plaintiff brought an action against the defendants under the Texas Trade Practices-Consumer 
Protection Act ("TTPCP A") for damages arising out of an alleged oral misrepresentation that 
defendants would sell a certain parcel of real estate to the plaintiff. 607 S. W.2d at 45. 
According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff approached the defendants to inquire whether they would 
be interested in selling their property. The Defendants subsequently wrote a letter to plaintiff 
stating that the price was acceptable, but refused to finance the transaction. Plaintiff took no 
further action regarding the transaction until he leamed that the property had been sold to a third-
party for $105,000. Plaintiff thereafter commenced a suit against the defendants alleging that the 
defendants had represented that the real estate in question would be sold to plaintiff for $75,000 
and that defendants' sale to the third-party, therefore, violated the TTPCP A. ld. Plaintiff sought 
damages for the difference between the $75,000 price allegedly promised and the $105,000 
received by the defendants. 
After analyzing relevant Texas case law, the Court concluded that the nature of the 
damages sought and the relationship of the promise to the purposes of the statute of frauds 
controlled application of the statute of frauds. The Court went on to hold that "both the alleged 
misrepresentation and the damages sought supported the conclusion that plaintiff is attempting to 
recover damages for failure to perform an oral promise governed by the statute of frauds." ld. at 
46. Importantly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that its conclusion may have been 
different if plaintiff's suit was predicated on the existence of a collateral representation separate 
from the promise to convey. ld. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposrrlON TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 3 
The reach of the Keriotis court's holding was subsequently clarified by the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas in McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211 (1987) 
(applying Texas law). In McClure, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant alleging that 
the defendant breached an agreement to sell a race horse to the plaintiff and that the defendants 
actions violated Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("TDTPA"). [d. at 213. The plaintiff, 
McClure, contacted the defendant, Duggan, who was a European race horse broker, and told him 
he desired to purchase a European race horse. Id. at 214. The parties thereafter met and 
discussed the proposed terms of sale. Duggan advised McClure the purchase price for the horse, 
which was located in Ireland, would be $600,000.00 and that Duggan's veterinarian in Ireland 
has pronounced the horse "sound." Following this conversation, McClure alleged that they 
entered into an oral agreement whereby McClure would purchase the horse for $600,000.00 
subject to the condition precedent that McClure's veterinarian would examine the horse in 
California and that McClure had the right to reject the horse if his veterinarian did not pronounce 
the horse "sound." Duggan denied that the parties had an agreement. McClure further alleged 
that Duggan later called him and told him not to wire the money because the horse would not 
''vet.'' Id. Duggan also denied making this statement. Ultimately, McClure did not tender the 
money, Duggan later sold the horse to another purchaser, and the horse won the Hollywood 
Derby conferring $175,000.00 in winnings on its new owner. Id. at 215. McClure brought suit 
against Duggan, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and TDTP A violations. Id. at 214. 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, applying Texas law, 
held that the oral agreement between McClure and Duggan did not satisfy the statute of frauds 
and was, therefore, unenforceable. Id. at 219. As to McClure's fraud and TDTPA claims, 
Duggan argued that even if he made the alleged misrepresentation that ''the horse would not vet," 
McClure's fraud and DPTA claims, which were based on this statement, were barred by the 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 4 
£ 
statute of frauds because those claims were in essence based on an unenforceable oral agreement. 
ld. at 220. The Court rejected this argument, holding that that McClure's fraud and DPTA 
claims were not barred by the statute of frauds as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court distinguished the case sub judice from Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1974), which is heavily relied upon by the Keriotis court, and deserves attention here. 
In Collins, the plaintiff and the defendant, as joint ventures, operated a train ride in an 
amusement park. Id. at 745-746. The defendant, who financed the business, and the plaintiff, 
who managed the business and drew a salary, orally agreed that they held a 60% and a 40% 
ownership interest in the business, respectively. ld. They also orally agreed that before plaintiff 
was entitled to a share of the profits, defendant would recover his initial investment in the first 
three years. ld. at 746. After managing the business for three years, plaintiff requested his share 
of the profits. Defendant refused plaintiff's request and said it was never his intention to allocate 
a share of the business to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit seeking recovery of his share of the 
profits. ld. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's decision granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs fraud claim was barred by the 
statute of frauds because plaintiff was seeking to recover what he would have gained had the 
promise been performed and that the gist of his cause of action was breach of the unenforceable 
promise. ld. at 747. 
After analyzing the Collins decision, the McClure court clarified the holding in Collins: 
The ... Collins decision[] stand[s] for the proposition that an 
unenforceable oral agreement cannot be the sole basis for an action 
sounding in fraud. When an oral agreement is rendered 
unenforceable by the statute of frauds, a purchaser cannot sustain 
an action for fraud by merely alleging that the seller made an oral 
promise without the intention of performing it. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 5 
Id. at 221. The _McClure court then went on to hold that Duggan's reliance on the Collins 
decision was misplaced: 
Duggan's reliance upon [the Collins case] is misplaced. The 
allegations contained in McClure's Complaint demonstrate that 
McClure's fraud claim is not based upon false oral promises 
but upon factual misrepresentations which were made 
collateral to the unenforceable agreement. A review of Texas 
law indicates that an important distinction must be made before it 
is summarily concluded that McClure has disguised his 
unenforceable contract claim in the form of a tort action. The 
distinction is this: If the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations 
were purely promissory, then a tort claim is barred by the statute of 
frauds; if the representations were factual, however, the plaintiff 
may seek recovery under a tort theory. 
Id. (emphasis added). The McClure court further found the Texas Supreme Court's decision in 
Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1931) particularly instructive. 
In Sibley, defendant Kern Lumber Company and its co-defendant stockholder and officer, 
Sibley, exchanged twenty-two houses and lots for land owned by Southland Life Insurance 
Company. Id. In the transaction, Sibley falsely represented that each of the houses was 
improved with brick veneer and had shown the insurance company twenty-two houses with brick 
veneer; however, one of the houses Sibley showed the insurance company and represented as 
being on Lot 7, which was a lot included in the transaction, was actually Lot 6, which was not 
included in the transaction. Lot 7 was vacant. Id. at 145-146. Sibley also promised that 
construction, which was underway, would be completed. Id. at 145. The insurance company 
brought suit against Sibley and Kern for the cost of completing construction and for the 
difference in value between Lots No. 6 and 7. Id. at 146. Sibley argued that his oral 
representations were barred by the statute of frauds. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, 
concluding that the statute of frauds was not a defense to the insurer's fraud action. Id. The 
McClure court summarized the Sibley decision as follows: 
PLAINTlFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 6 
Ii? If 
The plaintiffs action in Sibley was not based upon the 
defendant's failure to convey the land but rather upon the 
representations made collateral to the purchase contract . . . 
Since Sibley's misrepresentations were factual and made apart 
from any promise to remain secondarily liable, the Texas Supreme 
Court concluded that the statute of frauds was not a defense to the 
tort action of fraud. 
McClure, 674 F. Supp. at 222 (emphasis added). 
Based on its analysis of the Collins and Sibley decisions, the McClure court held: 
Here, in the instant case, Duggan's aJleged misrepresentations 
are separate and aside from the underlying oral agreement to 
sell Foscarini [the horse). If all McClure alleged was that 
Duggan had no intention of performing his oral promise to sell 
Foscarini when the promise was made, then in accordance with the 
holdings of Wade and Collins, McClure's fraud claim would be 
barred by the statute of frauds as a matter of law. But McClure 
alleges more than just an underlying intent not to perform an 
unenforceable oral agreement. McClure alleges that Duggan 
made a misrepresentation independent of the unenforceable 
oral agreement. McClure alleges that Duggan stated Foscarini 
would not "vet," when in fact the horse was capable of passing a 
veterinarian examination. Such facts as whether Duggan made this 
statement, whether it was true, or whether negotiations had 
progressed to such a point that the statement could be considered a 
condition precedent to the sale of Foscarini are all heavily 
disputed. Disputed facts when considered upon a motion for 
summary judgment must be resolved in the nonmovant's favor. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
2. Cannel and Its Progeny 
In addition to McClure, Hagood also cites the Florida Supreme Court's decision in 
Cannel v. Arcola Housing Corp. for the proposition that Plaintiffs' claims under the ICPA are 
barred by the statute of frauds. However, Hagood's isolated interpretation of Cannel, like his 
isolated interpretation of Keriotis, does not reflect the status of Florida's jurisprudence on the 
tort/statute of frauds issue. The following brief summary of Cannel and its progeny shows that 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMOR<\NDUM IN opposmON TO 
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 7 
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Florida courts are drawing similar conclusions to those reached in the Texas cases discussed 
above. 
In Cannel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant housing corporation, fraudulently 
told the plaintiffs, during negotiations leading up to the sale of certain lots, that the lots that were 
eventually purchased by plaintiffs would be proximate to certain beach facilities and that the 
proximity of these facilities to their lots would increase the value of their lots. l 65 So.2d at 850. 
The corporation never constructed the breach facilities and the plaintiffs brought suit alleging (1) 
that they would have not paid the price they had for their lots had they known the beach facilities 
would not be constructed and (2) that the defendant made the representations regarding the beach 
facilities with out any intention to build the facilities. Id. Assuming plaintiffs' allegations to be 
true, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the bathing facilities, had they been built, would 
have been maintained for the use and benefits of the homeowners and, therefore, that the builder 
had essentially agreed to create an easement in or over the land for the benefit of the 
homeowners. Id. at 850-851. Based on this premise, the court held that plaintiffs were 
attempting to enforce a mere oral promise to create the easement, which clearly fell within the 
statute of frauds and upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 851. 
The Florida District Court of Appeals subsequently distinguished the Cannel decision in 
Steinberg v. Kearns, 907 So.2d 691 (Fla. Dist. App. 2005). In Steinberg, the owner of an interest 
in two restaurants brought an action against the parties to whom he had assigned his interest, 
alleging, inter alia, breach of oral contract and fraudulent inducement. /d. at 691. The trial 
court, relying Khawly v. Reboul, 488 So.2d 856 (Fla. Dist. App. 1986). which cited Cannel, 
IOn page 6 of their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Hagood, citing to page 850 of 
the Cannel decision, states, "[t]he initial complaint in Cannel did not contain any allegations of fraud and was thus 
premised solely on breach of contract. Plaintiffs then moved to amend their complaint to add a claim for fraud in 
the inducement .... " This procedural history, however, is not located at page 850 of the Cannel decision or 
anywhere else in the decision and it is, therefore, unclear where Hagood obtained this information. 
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dismissed the plaintiffs fraud claim as being barred by the statute of frauds. Id. at 692. The 
Florida appellate court reversed, distinguishing Khawly and Cannel on the basis that those cases 
involved situations where the alleged fraudulent representations were part of the contract that, 
under the statute of frauds, had to be in writing. The Steinberg court, citing Florida Supreme 
Court precedent, explained: 
Where a contract exists, a tort action will lie for either intentional 
or negligent acts considered to be independent from acts that 
breached the contract. Fraudulent inducement is an independent 
tort in that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the 
breach of contract. It normally "occurs prior to tbe contract and 
the standard of truthful representation placed upon the 
defendant is not derived from the contract.» Steinberg alleges 
that appellees, Kearns and Evans, made false representations 
about a fact that existed before tbey entered into tbe contract 
which induced him to enter into the contract. Tbus, the tort as 
alleged is separate and distinct from any breacb of contract 
and is not barred by the statute of frauds. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
B. Plaintiffs' ICPA Claims Are Not Subject to Dismissal Under tbe Texas and Florida 
Courts' rationales in McClure and Steinberg Because Plaintiffs' IPCA Claims Are 
Predicated on Factual Representations Regarding the Auction Sale that Occurred 
Prior To Formation of The Oral Contract that Was Consummated Between Hagood 
and Plaintiffs At the Auction Sale. 
In Count IV of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged: 
36. To the extent the Statute of Frauds or similar law prohibits 
or renders void or voidable a sale of real property at "absolute 
auction", Defendants conduct in advertising, conducting and 
otherwise representing that an absolute auction of the real property 
at issue in this case without full disclosure of such prohibition or 
potential for a void result violated the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act, Idaho Code Section 48-601, et. seq., and applicable rules 
promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General, LD.A.P.A. Rule 
04.02.01.01, et. seq., in that it: 
a. Represented that goods or services had characteristics or 
qualities that they did not have; 
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b. Constituted an act or practice that is misleading, false or 
deceptive to the consumer; 
c. Constituted an initial offer to sell goods or services with 
material contingencies, conditions, or qualifications 
attendant to the offer without clearly and conspicuously 
disclosing such contingencies, conditions or qualifications 
(I.D.A.P.A. Rule 40); 
d. Constituted a direct or implied representation that goods or 
services could be purchased for a specified price, when that 
was not the case (Rule 60). 
It is apparent from the allegations in Count IV, that Plaintiffs' ICPA claim is predicated on the 
factual representations regarding the nature and terms of the auction sale the Defendants made 
before the sale. In the Terms and Conditions Sheet2 that was distributed to the public in advance 
of the auction sale, the Defendants made the following representations, among others: 
REAL ESTATE TERMS: Property sold Absolute Auction-No 
Reserve. Earnest money day of auction: $25,000.00 down on lots 1 
& 2; $50,000.00 dov,n on lot 3. Held in trust for 45 days due 
diligence, then released non refundable, to seller. Earnest money 
applied to purchase price at closing. Non-refundable earnest 
money unless defect found in title. 5% buyer's premium. Close 
within 30 days after 45 days due diligence. Bidding is not 
contingent upon financing and is buyer's responsibility and should 
be pre-arranged, if needed, so as to pay cash at closing. Financing 
Terms: Owner finance; Owner to carry with 20% down, interest 
only payments at 8% due in full 2 years from closing. 
APPROVAL OF BID PRICES: Successful bidder and runner-up 
bidder will be required to enter into purchase agreement at the 
auction site immediately following the close of the auction. 
DEED: Seller will provide a warranty deed. 
POSSESSION: Possession will be given at closing. 
In this Term Sheet and in the other advertisements that were disseminated to the public,3 
Defendants represented that Hagood's property would be sold to the highest bidder via "absolute 
2 The Terms and Conditions Sheet is attached as Exhibit "8" to the Affidavit of Mike Ressler submitted by Plaintiffs 
In Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3 One such advertisement is attached as Exhibit "8" to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
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auction," which as explained in Plaintiffs' prior summary judgment memoranda is a term of art. 
This, together with the other advertised terms, was a representation of fact regarding the type of 
auction that was to be held and the terms attendant to the auction sale. Like the plaintiff's fraud 
claim in McClure, the Plaintiffs' ICPA claim in this case is not based upon Hagood's failure to 
convey the land, but rather upon the representations made in the Term Sheet and advertisements 
representing that the property would be sold via absolute auction. In other words, Plaintiffs 
ICPA claim is not predicated on representations derived from the oral contract that was 
consummated between Hagood and Plaintiffs at the auction sale, which this Court has concluded 
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs, much like the plaintiffs in Steinberg, are 
alleging that the Defendants made deceiving representations about a fact that induced Plaintiffs 
to attend the auction sale and submit the highest bid before the contract was actually formed. 
These representations, under the standards announced in McClure and Steinberg, are collateral to 
or separate from Hagood's breach of his oral promise to convey the property. 
Stated differently, the play that is this case consists of three scenes: a pre-auction scene, 
an auction scene, and a post-auction scene. Plaintiffs' IePA claim is predicated solely on the 
representations the Defendants, including the auctioneer and the realtors, made in the pre-auction 
scene in materials they disseminated to the public that induced the Plaintiffs and others to attend 
the absolute auction and that were not otherwise modified during the auction scene itself. 
Plaintiffs' ICPA claim is not dependent on any representations that were made during the third 
scene, namely, the post-auction scene where Hagood breached his promise to convey the real 
property to Plaintiffs who were the highest bidders at the auction sale. Plaintiffs ' ICPA claim is 
analogous to the fraudulent inducement claims in Sibley and Steinberg in that the deceiving 
representations Defendants made in the auction materials that were disseminated to the public 
were representations that induced the Plaintiffs to attend the sale and enter into an oral contract 
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with Hagood. Defendants' representation that the property would be sold via "absolute auction" 
is, in essence, the same as a car dealer running a television advertisement offering to sale a car at 
a stated price to induce prospective car purchasers to its lot and then refusing to sell the car at the 
stated price. See IDAPA § 04.02.01.233.08 (noting that it is an unfair and deceptive act or 
practice for a dealer to fail to allow consumers to purchase all motor vehicles described by the 
advertisement at the advertised price.). 
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts in order for Plaintiffs' ICP A claim to be submitted 
to the trier-of-fact. The auction sale that occurred in this case falls within the definition of trade 
and commerce in Idaho Code § 48-602(2). Furthermore, the sale of real property falls within the 
definition of "goods" under Idaho Code § 48-602(6) and/or "services" under Idaho Code §48-
602. Additionally, the record before the court creates an issue of fact as to whether the auction 
materials the Defendants disseminated to the public advertising the auction as being absolute or 
without reserve had a capacity or tendency to deceive consumers. See State ex reI. Kidwell v. 
Master Distrib., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122 (Idaho 1980) (noting that in order for an act or practice 
to be considered unfair under the ICPA, a plaintiff need only show that the act or practice 
possesses a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers). The Plaintiffs, who do not have to 
show intent to deceive to state a claim under the ICPA, see id. at 122-123, have satisfied this 
burden, particularly in light of the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the ICPA is 
to be liberally construed. Fenn v. Noah, 133 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Idaho 2006). 
C. Plaintiffs Are Seeking Damages Under the ICPA, Not Benefit of the Bargain 
Contract Damages. 
Defendant Hagood's argument that Plaintiffs ICPA claim is merely a guise to seek 
benefit of the bargain contract damages should likewise be rejected. As noted above, Plaintiffs 
have alleged sufficient facts to pursue a claim under the rcp A. Damages under the rcp A are 
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statutorily controlled by Idaho Code § 48-608. Section 48-608 allows a plaintiff who suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, to recover actual damages or one 
thousand dollars per violation, whichever is greater. The amended complaint pleads exactly that. 
The ICPA claim, for reasons discussed above, is a separate claim that stands on its own from the 
contract counts Plaintiffs alleged against Hagood, which have been dismissed. If Plaintiffs are 
successful on their ICPA claim, they should be entitled to the damages allowed under 48-608. 
Indeed, Hagood acknowledges on page 9 of his summary judgment memorandum that a litigant 
is entitled to tort damages if the cause of action truly sounds in tort. Consistent with this 
rationale, where Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state an ICPA claim, Plaintiffs' ICPA 
claim stands on its own and Plaintiffs should be entitled to the damages allowed under the ICPA 
if Plaintiff s prevail. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendant 
Hagood's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this '1~"y of July, 2009. 
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